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Determinism and the Law
By MoRms D. FoRKoscH*
Determinism is, simply stated, a doctrine that acts of the will,
occurrences in nature, or social or psychological phenomena are
determined by antecedent causes. Determinism, as a general
philosophic concept, can be utilized to clarify legal concepts,
point out alternatives and consequences to legal methods, and
enable practitioners and others to comprehend particular applica-
tions of the law as well as theory. To illustrate technically and
particularly, it might be asked, are there a certain number of
essential elements in a pleading which, when proved, auto-
matically and irresistibly mandate a verdict?' Are these elements
or their combinations absolutely static, or is there a degree of
flexibility? Or is it that there are different conclusions of law
dependent upon various combinations of changing facts?2 Can a
defendant be permitted to justify his actions, cast doubt upon the
plaintiff, or otherwise successfully counter his prosecution, i.e.,
does the proof of the essential elements, without more, suffice?3
To illustrate generally, are there anti-laws which can be char-
acterized as rejections of determinism? Do these statutory efforts
run counter to the inflexible "nature" of man? For example, con-
sider the victimless conduct of prostitutes, pimps, gamblers, homo-
sexuals, and so on-can their "crimes" be eradicated? Can such a
fundamental change in man occur?4 Stare decisis does not mean
* Prof. University of San Diego School of Law; J.S.D. 1948, New York Univ.,
Ph.D., 1952, Grad. Faculty, New School; M.S.Sc., 1958, L.L.M., 1932, St. John's
Univ.
I E.g., failing to comply with a factory inspection statute establishes negligence
as a matter of law. M. FoRKoscHr, A TREATisE ON LABOR LAw 109 (2d ed. 1965).2 See, e.g., M. COHEN, REASON AND NATURE 207 (1931). This author states
that ,It follows, therefore, that a system may be determined in its mechanical
features and physically undetermined, without any breaks or discontinuity in our
laws of nature," and who earlier refers to "the principle of rational determinism.'
Id. at 159.
3 See, e.g., W. PRossER, HANDBoox Or THE LAW OF TORTS 143 (4th ed. 1971),
on the essential elements required of a tort plaintiff, and 416 n.1, on the com-
paratively recent defense of contributory negligence.
4 See also text and notes 73-74, infra. The controversy during the 1960's
between the proponents and opponents of anti-discrimination laws is another
illustration of this two-ipart approach to determinism, one argument being that
such prejudices were inherent in man's nature and could not be changed, the
counter being that it was not this that the law struck at, but only its outward
manifestations or conduct. See, with references therein, FoRtoscn, LABOR LAw,
supra n.1, § 83.
DETERmIIM AND TH LAW
inflexibility, nor does necessity, as de Tocqueville put it, mean
irresistibleness, but man's search for stability has always exerted
an attraction for rigidity and Draconian effectuation. Even the
current generation's actions may be viewed as a gesture against
unyieldingness and inexorability-a plea for a degree of modi-
fication.
I
One approach to an understanding of determinism is to see
man's view of himself and his environment in terms of control,
that is, of what is, and what is not, within his ability to command
or, at least, sway. One school sees the entirety of time as prede-
termined in all its ramifications, from Genesis to Doomsday, from
within man to without man, so that there is nothing to be done
except to live as so directed. 5 This school would have us believe
that there is not the slightest degree of choice, alternative, or
responsibility, and so there can be no conscience, liability, or
accountability.6 And, to raise one important question for law,
what is, or can there be, truth?7  If whatever happens occurs
causally because of past and existing conditions which, given as
facts, prevent anything else from being able to happen, i.e., every-
thing is ordained, then truth is not subject to the type of "trial" or
5 See, e.g., the historical approach of Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803)
who, in his major work, Ideas of the Philosophy of the History of Humanity, written
in 1784, felt that although God designed the world He does not interfere; that
civilization and history are purely natural phenomena with events being strictly
determined continuity being unbroken, and that what occurs at any moment
must have happened then and never at any other time. Thus there is no free will,
an impotency in man's ability or efforts to guide his destiny, and a rigid
determinism which is not overcome by his view that each nation's culture is
different from all others and that a single uniform pattern of interpretation is not
Sossible. See generally, A. LovEjoy, ESSAYS IN TE HISTORY OF IDEAS 166-182
1960); see also J. BURY, THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 240-241 (1932) [hereinafter
cited as BRY, PRocrnss].
6 See, e.g., the formulation of this concept in a more extended fashion in S.
HooK, "MoRAL FREEDOm IN A DErEBmnED WORLD," reprinted in his THE QUEST
FOR BEING 29 (1960).
7For a discussion of truth that is of a "factual" or "objective" nature, so that
a trial and a verdict may be had in a court of law, see, e.g., FoaxoscH, THE NATURE
OF LEGAL EVIDENCE, 59 CALIF. L. REV. 1356 (1971) [hereinafter cited as NATURE
OF LEGAL EVIDENCE]; and see also J. S. MILL, AuTroBIOGRAi'i 158 (J. Cross ed.
1924). Of prime importance is W. JAwms, PRAGMATISM, (R. Perry ed. 1955), con-
taining not only the sixth lecture on "Pragmatism's Conception of Truth," but also
four additional essays on its meaning.
For one existentialist's view see, e.g., S. KIErGAAMD, P~mrosoPicAL FRAc-
Nmtrs (1936), with which contrast the intrinsic approach to philosophical
propositions of R. DESCARTES, DIScoURsE PART IV, PHlLOSOPInCAL WRITINGS (N.
Smith ed. 1952) and the seventeenth century English materialists, e.g., Thomas
Hobbes' thoughts (to him it was "necessitation," not determinism) as discussed by
J. LAIR, HOBBES (1934).
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pro-and-con "proof' one finds in a court of law. As with condi-
tions, so are our impulsess also causally determined. Hence, no
choice is available; there is no randomness, no meaninglessness,
in the world.
Thus for the existing conditions there were pre-existing ones,
and for those others, and so on indefinitely backward as well as
forward into the future. Logically, this extreme position is not
only a basis for Savigny's historical approach 9 but, if followed,
also would snuff out experimentation in, say, the natural sciences.
The reason for this is that the natural sciences necessarily utilize
a form of determinism. Basic to the sciences is the function of
causal physical relationships, so that if all is foreordained then
deliberate change or betterment as such is impossible. Anthro-
pologically, Malinowski has utilized the word law in two senses,
first, in "the sense of a rule of intrinsic determinism of a process,"
and, second, "as a promulgated command of authority sanctioned
by force. . .",,0 with the first, in effect, emphasizing the determi-
nistic concept. One school of behavioral psychologists, kmown as
environmental behavioralism, hold to the view that the environ-
mental stimuli, which include a person's genetic 1 endowment,
8This distinction between "impulses" and "conditions" may be argued from
many points of view, e.g., epistemologically. The bifurcation, nevertheless, permits
us to speak of "external" events without reference to a "subjective" mind, that is,
we can retain a degree of flexibility in this discussion without being compelled to
choose between crass materialism or pure solipsism or any other approach.
9 See, e.g., COHEN, REASON, supra note 2, at 374, where, in commenting upon
jurisprudence, he refers to several authors and of Savigny writes: "Since the past
completely determines the present, the idea that each generation can make its legalworld for good or ill according to its power and insight is the essence of theunhistorical view. For another analysis, and definition, of determinism see, e.g.,J. WALsis, FREE WILL. 115, at 127 (1962).
lo B. MAx~nmOWSx, FnnaooM AND CIVILIZATION 173 (1960 ed. 1944) therein-
after cited as MAI~u'owsm, FREEDOM]. The first sense refers to the physical, i.e.,
"through scientific research we construct an exact and empirical ?ormula of aprocess which describes it, estabishe s uniformity, and allows us to foresee and
to predict the course of events within an isolated systemi...." Id. at 175.
11 On genetic determinism (to coin this phrase) see, e.g., Professor lensen'sviews that a child's I.Q. cannot be raised because of its high heritability, supported
in its conclusion by H. EYsEscn, THE LQ. AnG_ N (1971). For the pros and
cons in this area see book reviews entitled Unknowns in the IQ Equation by S.
Scarr-Salapetek in 174 SCIENCE 1223 (1971). In Sacramento, California, a class
suit was ified in the Superior Court by Christopher Sombrano, Efren Ruize, andSixto Torres, eighth and seventh graders, against the State Board of Education,
seeking to stop school districts from placing I.Q. scores in their school records.
Santa Monica Outlook, Dec. 18, 1971.
The Coleman Report's finding, however, is that under certain conditions the
education of black children is improved when theY are moved from a segregated
school situation into one where white children are found (ratios not here discussed),
which means that they can be bettered. U.S. Dof"T. oF H.E.W., EQuALIrt O
EDUCATIONAL OiPOITHITY (1966). See also n tes 13 and 44, infra.
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cause him to behave as he does, there being no "mind" or "auton-
omous man."12 A second school utilizes the approach that to
change man's conduct we must first change his thinking and his
emotions, i.e., conditioning behavioralism.1
While such a rigid, inflexible, and crassly deterministic ap-
proach to phenomena and thought is somewhat 4 understand-
able,15 this does not necessarily make it acceptable. It denigrates
man, takes from him any independence or freedom, and in effect
robotizes him and leaves him without a soul, without even the
ability to make a moral judgment or to have a belief in a God.16
People are therefore bereft of emotion, love, faith, or any hope
for the future; change is impossible, and man cannot freely
progress .17 Neither can there be any ability to alter man's con-
duct, so that the concept and application of social control is an
12Quaere: does not this ability to "change" through man's efforts (see, e.g.,
note 7, infra) illustrate one analogical aspect of soft determinism in action? (On
soft determinism see notes 20-25 infra and accompanying text).
Behavioralism is not to be confused with determinism, on which see text and
notes 17, 73, and 78-79, infra. On the strictness of naturalistic principles vis--vis
hard determinism see, e.g., BuRy, PROGRESS, supra note 5, at 170-171.
13 See, e.g., B. F. SKIN4NEn, BEYOND FnEF-.oM Am DIrNrrY (1971), who re-
jects "free will" and "autonomy as "prescientific" ideas and feels that as environ-
mental stimuli condition and control, then change here will change conduct. Such
behavior therapy utilizes different forms of rewards or benefits in this controlled
conditioning process. Thus, even though this school denies a mind or autonomy
in man generally, they must concede it in themselves, i.e., they choose direction,
rewards, application, etc.-a form of soft determinism (on this see text keyed to
notes 20-25, infra, and cf. text and note 18, infra). For a vigorous critique of
Skinner, see book review by N. Chomsky, Nmv YoRK REviEw, Dec. 30, 1971, at 18,
although compare N. CHOMSKy, PROBLE:mS OF KNOWLEDGE AND FR EDOM (1971).
All of the preceding, in one form or another, and in some degree, may be
found applied in the nation's public schools and even into the colleges and uni-
versities. See notes 11, supra, and 44, infra.
14 In this writer's opinion, hard determinism contains an internal flaw, that is,
a contradiction. It must reduce everything to a quantified and crass materialism,
rejecting anything subjective except as tied in strictly and rigidly with and to the
former. Then wh does this deterministic concept not include, or explain since
it cannot reject, the uncertainty principles as applied in atomic physics, namely,
there is a limit to atomic scale measurement because this measurement process
itself alters or changes the situation? See also note 45, infra. Furthermore, the
"black bole" concept promulgated thirty-three years ago by Oppenheimer and
Snyder ("that a great assembly of matter, as in a large, burned out star, would
collapse into something so dense that it would become invisible"), indicates, as
per the classic calculations, that it, the black hole, should shrink until the
infinitely dense mass was confined into an infinitely small area, and time, also,
"would behave in bizarre ways." As quoted from W. Sullivan, New York Times,
Dec. 29, 1971 at 18, col. 1.
IS Extremes and rigidities are not limited to determinism. Consider for
example, the concepts of solipsism and Manichaeism.
16 See note 39 and text, infra.
17 On the idea of progress, and its necessary utilization of soft determinism,
see, e.g., BuRy, PnoGRESS, supra note 5, at 171, 240.
1972]
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aberration' 8--it is the death of law, and as a corollary the death
of the nation. 9 Man therefore must necessarily reject such a
physical or similar form of harsh determinism which in this man-
ner spills over into other areas of human conduct, thought, morals
and ethics.
It is because of these and other flaws in the idea of hard
determinism that the vast majority of philosophers and lawyers
today reject not only such an unyielding approach and series of
logical extensions or sorites but also, perhaps, the other extreme-
the liberty of indifference. ° Instead, they accept and utilize a
softer concept which embraces a degree of self-determination or
indeterminism, of what may also be called operational free will
in which man independently is a, if not the, source or cause of his
own conduct in a significant degree.2' John Stuart Mill in the last
century, and Jean-Paul Sartre and other existentialists in this cen-
tury, propounded such a view, with the latter generally defending
18 See text and notes 12-13, supra, and 78-79, infra, and also MALiNowsxr,
FREEDOM, supra note 10, at 175 where he writes: "Freedom in the naive sense
of a free floating quality obviously becomes meaningless when applied to such a
process controlled by cultural determinism." On this last type of determinism see
his Chapter 6. See also the conflict between the "scientific management" concept
of the Taylorism of the 1930's and man's freedom in H. MuLLER, FREEDOM IN THE
MODERN WORLD 69-70 (New York: 1966), and see further pp. 185 et seq. on
scientific determinism and irrationalism, and passim on economic and other aspects
of determinism.
19 The following illustration of this startling conclusion bears it out in several
ways: The problem of population control (decrease) with the concomitant food
control (increase), requiring man's experiments and evaluations. See, e.g., Com-
MrrrE ON RESOURCES AND MAN, NATiONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCEs, BREsoURCEs
AND MAN (1969), and J. BLAcK & M. KiEFER, FUTuRE FOOD AND AcarcuIALr
PoLIcY (1948).
20 Jonathan Edwards's approach (infra note 27) rejects the state and liberty of
indifference (at 320 et seq.), especially (for us) as it "destroys the great difference
of degrees of the guilt of different crimes, and takes away the heinousness of the
most flagitious horrid inequities . . ." (at 322). The more one (i.e., "the soul")
"has of this disengagedness, in its acting, the more liberty.... [Which eventually,
in its extreme form of liberty, brings] a full and perfect freedom and liableness to
act altogether at random, without the least connection with, or restraint on
government by, any dictate of reason . . . [and] as being inconsistent with the
full and perfect sovereignty of the will over its own determinations .. ." (at 272).
The conflict between such determinism and indifference is highlighted by
Duncan-Jones, FREEDOM: AN ILLUSTRATIVE PUZZLE, PROCEEDINGS ARISTOTELIAN
SocmTy, N.S. (1938-39), where, at 108, he assumes a particular decision now
made is, within a certain range, not determined, so that even though his life
before is identical, he might now have made a different decision, and thus "I am
therefore not responsible for having made this precise decision. And so on. A
fortiori, unrestricted indifference is inconsistent with responsibility. We therefore
have a simple constructive dilemma. If determinism is true, people are not
responsible, and if the liberty of indifference is true, people are not responsible;
but either determinism or the liberty of indifference is true; therefore people are
not responsible." Obviously the present writer's approach rejects these excluding(Continued on next pagei
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freedom but not chance.23 And so, too, are most of the scientists
who engage in the exploration of mind or matter, soft, rather than
hard, determinists, in that they believe they can somehow affect
or influence, if not determine or control, their brain children.
For them it is almost a clich6 that "Neither mind nor culture is
even thinkable without each other, but this does not mean that
one is reducible to the other. In the final analysis, culture is a
product, the synthesis of mind and action."24 The three most
obvious and important current illustrations of this soft, rather
than hard, approach are the willed, hopeful, and optimistic efforts
by atomic scientists, environmentalists, and the United Nations.25
II
This dualistic distinction between what philosophers26 term
hard and soft determinism is found not only in life in general
but also in legal theory and in legal practice, expressly or im-
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
extremes so that no true disjunctive dilemma is presented, that is, Russell's
practical approach (infra note 28) must be utilized even though his resulting con-
clusion is rejected (infra note 30, because his "free will" in that context is really
the extreme liberty of indifference).2 1 See, e.g., Boas, The Problem of Responibility, in EssAYs IN LEGAL HISTORY
IN HONOR OF FELix FRANKFUTER 504-05 (M. Forkosch ed. 1966) [hereinafter
cited as BoAS, REsPONsmrrIY]:
The problem of responsibility then is not solved by an appeal to universal
determinism. For that matter if determinism is really universal, then
human beings cannot be said to escape from it.... What I am saying
then is that universal determinism does not eliminate human responsi-
bility .... If, for instance, we maintain that a human being is a partial
cause of what he does, we do not, it will be observed, commit ourselves
to the doctrine of free will in the most extended sense of that term. A
human being can act with a clear vision of what he wants to accomplish,
but in that vision must be included the limitations of his possibilities....
22 Although writing that man is "condemned" to be free, his idea of freedom
in this aspect is somewhat restricted, even though subsequently utilizing it as a
positive condition for man's emergence. J. SARTRE, EXISTENTIALISM AND
HumAN EMOTONS (1957), and see also his Ex=STENTaism 12 (1947). The
"responsibility" which existentialists advocate is deserving of extended treatment;
for example they feel that existence precedes essence, which means that man is
meaninglessly existent but always free to choose and define his essential self
through his conduct, so that he is therefore responsible for all he says and does.
23 Chance, as a philosophical concept, may be treated in several ways (see,
e.g., notes 28-30 infra). "Such original or underived individuality and diversity is
precisely what Pierce means by chance; and from this point of view chance is prior
to law. The doctrine of the primacy of chance naturally suggests the primacy of
mind .. . Cohen, Introduction to, C. PimcE, CHANCE, LovE AN LOGIC xii, xiii
(1949).
24 R. Mum'nv, THE DrALiEcrcs OF SociAL LIFE 204 (1971).
25 The first seek to prevent, in the United States, the self-destructive and
necessitous (bard determinism?) urge by the government in proceeding with tests,
building of reactors with minimum safeguards, etc.; the second seeks to overcome
the inherent consequences of "civilization's" technology; and the third seeks to(Continued on next page)
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pliedly. For example, the legalistic, but not necessarily the
religious 27 or practical' s concept of free will,28 in a murder trial,
finds the accused being held personally responsible for the con-
sequences of his willed actions;30 or, in a breach of contract suit,
a contractor, in one situation, is required to show fraud or duress
before his assumed freely-exercised consent can be disproved.
In both these illustrations the inability to have or to exercise any
choice 31 whatsoever would necessarily mean a verdict determined
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
prevent international self-annihiliation. All these, and other illustrations which
come to the reader's mind, disclose a rejection ot hard determinism; otherwise why
make any effort against "inevitableness'?2 6 For distinction between hard and soft determinism, see W. JAMwms, EssAYs
ON FA= AN MoRAIs 145-183 (1949). See also note 29 infra. See R. TAYLOR
AND W. DRAY, 2 TEE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF Pnn.osoPmH 359, 373 for a discussion of
ethical, logical, theological, physical and psychological determinism. See also,
A. OLDNQUIST, CHoosING, DEcIDING AND DOING 96-104 ( ), and E. W.LSON
ED., Fn _ OM OF CHOICE: A Symposi (1970).27 Freedom of the Will as discussed by J. Edwards (P. Ramsey ed. 1957).
This article denigrates human reason, seeks to destroy the almost inconceiv-
ably pernicious' concept of self-determination, and still concludes that God's
determination of human life doesn't 'at all excuse sin' i e. 'there cannot
be anything coming to pass without a cause' and so he is"opposing' the
'hypothesis that there can be 'acts of the will coming to pass without a
cause.' Id. 183. See also note 33 infra.2 8 See, e.g., B. RussELL's, HumAN SociErY IN ETmcs A D PoLmcs 79 (1955).
The authorphilosophically rejects "universal causation" yet states "as a common-
sense individual I hold it to be an indispensable postulate in the conduct of affairs.
For practical purposes, we must assume that our volitions have causes, and our
ethics must be compatible with this assumption ... " (concluding as in note 30,
infra). However, on another practical aspect see, e.g., the warning by the N.Y.C.
Police Commissioner Murphy given to his men concerning departmental cor-
ruption: "You must help me to 'change the job.' It means giving up the attitude
that you can't do anything about corruption, that it's inevitable .... " Quoted
by T. Buckley, "Murphy Among the Meat-Eaters," N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 1971,
(Magazine) at 44.
29 William James, admittedly a disciple of Pierce (supra note 23), sought to
resolve the logical conflict between free will and determinism through a doctrine of
chance, this latter being defined in a purely negative fashion, i.e., merely the
negation of necessity. See his "The Dilemma of Determinism," in THE WILL TO
BELIEVE, AND OTHER ESSAYS iN POPUL..R PHLOSOPsn (1897), also repr. in A.
CASTEL L, ED., ESSAYS IN PRAGMAISM (1948) also given in note 26, supra.30 See, e.g., Hall, From Legal Theory to Integrative Jurisprudence, 83 U. OF
GIN. L. lB'v. 1, 3 (1964): "The basic ethical postulate of this theory is that onlythe voluntary commission of legally proscribed harms is within the scope of
criminal iablity; this implies the restriction of mens rea to intentionality and
recklessness .. See also note 71, infra, where the Durham court, at 874, stated:
"The legal and moral traditions of the western world require that those who,
of their own free will and with evil intent (sometimes called mens rea), commit
acts which violate the law, shall be criminally responsible for those acts ..
Cf., however, RUSSEL'S conclusion (quoted in note 28, supra) that "Praise and
blame, reward and punishment, and the whole apparatus of the criminal law, are
rational on the deterministic hypothesis, but not on the hypothesis of free will."
See, however, note 20, supra.
31 It may be argued that if any choice, in its ordinary meaning, is presented
or permitted in adhering to hard determinism then automatically, and without
(Continued on next page)
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in advance, regardless of the so-called facts, and the rejection of
general rules of conduct or principles of law. These latter may
also be termed generalities, assumptions, fictions, or beliefs. That
is, they are not necessarily in accord with the facts and to that
extent are therefore fictitious. They may find their wellspring in
ethical principles, man's love or humanism, and may change as
the needs of the times require, i.e., rules of law are not static or
rigidly determined.
This overall approach is also found in other disciplines: Adam
Smith's use of the fictional self-centered (or economic) man in
the political economy who exercises freedom of choice, will, and
desire; Jeremy Bentham's fictions in political (legal) theory and
Immanuel Kant's in philosophy (his "heuristic fictions"); and
Hans Vaihinger's Philosophy of "As If," in which juristic fictions
are treated as but one aspect of this concept found in many fields.3 2
When fictions or assumptions are so deliberately created and used
they disclose another aspect of soft determinism; for, if pre-
determinism3 3 is accepted then why bother with fictions when,
computer-like, all present and future conditions flow out of past
and pre-determined occurrences? 31 It is extrapolation, not inter-
pretation, which applies.
Every student, practitioner, and jurist can give hundreds of
fictions in the law, e.g., that we are all legitimate and sane (until
proved otherwise). And, as has already been seen, one of the
most influential and widely used legalistic assumptions is that
there is freedom of the will, and therefore the individual's con-
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
more, there is a necessary collapse into soft determinism. In other words, and
by analogy to, for example, solipsism, a really hard or extreme determinist cannot
conceive of any other system, or of any degree of choice, or of the chaos within
the particles of matter wherein chance, not order, seemingly prevails. It is thus
not an either/or which is presented, for this per se rules out any hard determinism,
butt rather, the wearing of deterministic blinders which not only circumscribe
one s mental vision but also preclude any other ray of light from entering. See also
text keyed to note 41, infra.
82 Tr. C. K. OGDEN 8335 (1935).
83 A religious aspect may also be found here, that is, those who so believe
therefore need not fear the future. However, is there not an element of soft
determinism found when they also believe that if (a choice?) they conduct them-
selves properly here, then their future is assured in the hereafter? See also notes
27 and 34. Of course another aspect might result in fatalism, but, again, does not
such a believer then also ask of what avail are his present acts, and therefore
convince himself that his conduct can be his own (that is, as he pleases)?
a 4 The assumption here is that all known facts go into the computer; this, for
mnsinvention, is obviously impossible (at least as of now), but is not God the
"Great Computer" in the sky?
1972.]
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sequent personal responsibility for his actions follows because of
this ability to choose. Choice, discretion, novation are not limited
to the law, but are reflected therein. For simple examples, the cit-
izen may, if he desires, spit on the sidewalk, but he knows that he
thereby violates the law and may be punished; or, an individual
is subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury and if offered im-
munity, his choice is ordinarily between testimony and con-
tempt;3 5 or, once convicted, the prisoner's chosen conduct may
give him earlier parole, etc.
So also does society offer rewards and punishments to influence
and bring about "correct" individual choices or group ones such
as the federal offering of grants-in-aid to states, direct or indirect
aid to housing projects, day care centers, by tax abatement or re-
duction or otherwise. The national weal is not only furthered but
also protected by these choices, e.g., one could have opted for
reserve training instead of remaining subject to the draft. In this
sense such governmentally projected choices may be used to
protect, support, and further the acceptance of institutions or of
values and thereby prevent or diminish opposition and revolution.
The point is that soft determinism is a practical36 and essential
element in every nation's efforts to maintain itself and control
(condition?) its citizenry, whether by civil or criminal laws, grants,
rewards, or punishments.
III
This deterministic bifurcation is found throughout the warp
and woof of every civilization, culture, and conflict, as exempli-
fied in the positivistic explanation and logical extension of a
(assumed and rigid) premise, which is contrasted with the socio-
logical (changing) base from which the rules allegedly spring;
natural law theory, in this respect, somewhat quaffs at both
fountains. Practically, however, could there have been progress,
technology, and increasing standards of living without a degree
of causality, but also combined with choice, that is, a pluralistic
society in a pluralistic universe?37 In one peripheral aspect, not
a3 Cf., however, the existentialist's view on choice as given in Sartre's works,
e.g., note 22, supra.
36 See, e.g., note 28; see also note 4.
37 One social (business) psychologist distinguishes between the "minimun"
and the "maximum" man in a behavioral, not deterministic, aspect of a business(Continued on next page)
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too far-fetched, such bifurcation with its aleatory approach has
sprung from and dialectically conduced to the general acceptance
of scientism over universalism. Evolution s8 and quantification
also seemingly have replaced religion and intuition. "God is
dead"-9 is not a peculiarly modern existentialist expression" but is
found in the centuries preceding this, likewise the evolutionary
conception of man can be seen long ago in the Renaissance, and
even before then in classical Greece.
The difference between hard and soft determinism may also
be highlighted by asking, can man truly influence his future?
Put differently, is the Greek view of a buffetted individual at the
mercy of the gods and their whims who is overcome by fate and
incapable of doing aught to escape the future, the correct one?
Or is man able to control his life and his conduct, even if only a
trifle? If man's thought and course of conduct are completely,
fully, and finally determined for him, whether by an external
Being, or forces, or conditions, and he is without any power to
will, alter, or even condition these influences, then hard determin-
ism in its extreme and rigid form emerges and we have man
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
setting. The contrast suggests a parallel or analogical difference here, as in this
paper, is being made. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 20, 1971, at 22, col. 4.38 See, e.g., Weightman, "The Concept of the Avant-Garde," ENCOUNTER
XXXIII (July, 1969) pp. 5, 8, speaking of "the latest of a long and extremely
complicated process, which is, of course, the general change-over from the static
or cyclical view of human existence to the evolutionary view. Evolutionism is,
fundamentally, a scientific concept....
39This is Nietzche's nineteenth century expression, supra note 9. See S.
KnMMEGAARD, PIMosoPRcAL F AsGMxNTS, supra note 7, at 31-35, who rejects the
nineteenth century "proof' of God, and also J. SAITRE, ExisTrENTLUM, supra
note 22.
Albert Einstein and Arnold Toynbee illustrate the devout believer, one the
physical and the other the social scientist, who rejects the exclusivity of technology
and materialism because either God doesn't play dice or because there is a
"reality" behind the universe. In either case there is a rejection of discontinuity,
an acceptance of unitary causality, and a belief in a continuum of some degree of
rigidity. The only question then presented would be whether man could function
independently, in the slightest degree, within this conceptual sphere. Both would
answer yes, the first because of what he accomplished, if for no other reason, and
the second because, quoting Plato's rendition of Socrates, the Old One speaks of
his "individuality" vis-l-vis other individualities, and, further, because Toynbee
remarks that "Man can deliberately combat his egocentricity, and perhaps he can
partially overcome it." See, e.g., A. TOYNBEE, StmVIVNG TBE FUrUREr (1971).40 E.g., Heidegger, "Nietzsches Wort 'gott ist tot," HOLZWEGE (1952). See
especially J. SAnTE, EXisTENTiAmsm, supra note 22, at 18: "Atheistic existential-
ism, which I represent . . . states that God does not exist. . . . Man is nothing
else but what he makes of himself. Such is the first principle of existentialism....'
There is, of course, much contrary opinion, e.g., Alexander I. Solzhenitsyn, who
writes that Russia's censors "demand that the word God be unfailingly written
without a capital letter. To this indignity I cannot stoop.... [It] is the cheapest
kind of atheistic pettiness... ." New York Times, June 18, 1971, at 5, col. 1.
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bereft of free will, i.e., fatalism.41 In the history of thought, ideas,
and law these complex views emerge in various shapes and forms,
although the simple extremes of non-determinism and (hard)
determinism are seldom, if ever, expressed or found in actual
conduct; the in-between, or soft determinism, is what men
ordinarily and normally go by, and their lives and laws reflect
this.
By illustration, if one believes that the "impersonal" forces of
the market really determine prices, or that the national economy
is truly self-regulating, then his approach is to let them function
without interference. This is Adam Smith's general laissez-faire
principle. If, however, man feels he can influence the causes
then his various efforts are understandable, e.g., nationally, the
Sherman Antitrust Act, the Employment Act of 1946 and its
Council of Economic Advisers, the 1971-72 price-wage freezes,
Phases I and II, and internationally, the European Common
Market, population and birth control, agricultural changes and
efforts. Whether these laws and efforts are because even Pandora
found hope, or man is part of God, or there is some free will in
all human beings, is here immaterial-the fact is that man so
believes.4 More importantly, man so acts and conducts himself
and his interpersonal and other relations, and the law accepts and
builds upon man's freedom to choose. And, further, without this
practice, and despite any negative theory and the consequences
flowing from these acts, the technological, economic, and scientific
progress achieved over the past two centuries would have been
impossible-even though these latter results now "condition" the
law and its approach; now the law permits class and other environ-
mental and consumer suits which would have been rejected
yesteryear.43
Thus, in fields of conduct as well as in theory the concept of
soft determinism is also found. Every businessman, large or small,
41 For a comprehensive study of fatalism see Steven M. Calm, FATE, LoGIC,
AND Tnms (1967). See also note 83, supra.4 2 In general, see S. Hook, DFTmuvtmmmM AND Framom 3N =an AGE oF
MoDERN SCIENCE (1958).
43 See, e.g., Parker (Volpe) v. Citizens Committee for the Hudson Valley
400 U.S. 949 (1970); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970); and Association
of Data Processing Service Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970). For one sug-
gestion in this general area, see this writers Administrative Conduct in Environ-
mental Areas-A Suggested Degree of Public Control, 12 So. TEx. LJ. 1 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Administrative Conduct].
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assumes the possibility, even probability, of his volitional impact
upon the (slight or large segment of the) market; the consumer's
"choice" is today defended and aided more than ever before
individually, collectively, administratively, statutorily, and ju-
dicially; our environment is sought to be cleansed on the basis of
chosen option and directed power; the physician has replaced the
witch-doctor, and medicine's strides have refuted the implac-
ability of past centuries' resignation; the psychotherapist neces-
sarily utilizes the soft approach-otherwise patients are de-
frauded;44 the Newtonian solidity has been ousted by the Ein-
steinian and latter-day conclusions regarding chaos and inde-
terminism within particles; 45 the medieval belief in a completed
universe has been replaced by the modem one in which it is
evolving in time;46 the local and national politician seeks to
influence the voters, and on the international scene much is made
of the concept applied between and among nations, and also
where individuals within nations attempt to travel, improve them-
selves, etc.; and even in the classroom, as with that old time
religion, every teacher assumes the perfectability of the students
and their changeableness.
IV
Soft and hard determinism, as with soft and hard ice-cream,
may sometimes be found together, and even in one man. This,
perhaps, may throw light on the law's reluctance to consign hard
determinism to the ash-heap, and also explain how and why
"incompatible" or "inconsistent" laws are occasionally bed-fellows.
The illustrations may be taken from economic, philosophical, and
political institutions, as well as the law.
44 See, e.g., Sigmund Freud's 'Moral Responsibility for the Content of
Dreams," in J. Stracey, trans. COM:LETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND
FnarD XIX, 131-34 (1961), and also E. Erikson, "On the Sense of Inner Identity,"
in Knight and Friedman, eds., PsycHoANALYTc PsYcHATRY AND PSYCHOLOGY
(1954).45 See supra note 14. Discoveries may really be an illustration of hard
determinism; for example, consider the periodic table of elements and its predic-
tions before the actualities; Einstein, Bohr, and others predicted, over fifty years
ago, the present day laser phenomenon. But, and regardless of these and other like
demonstrations of sufficient cause-effect relationships, why a break-through at this
particular moment? Why this person and not that one? Why in this country and
not in another? Why do "teams" fail and yet the lone wolf succeed? There are
too many unanswered whys (and see also note 24 supra).
46 But only questionably determined, within limits permitting of a disordered
continuity, and thus making predictions possibly only on an iffy basis.
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Marx, for example, claimed to have up-ended extremist
Hege1 7 and thereby to have made the latter's philosophical
approach, dialectical methodology, susceptible to the formers
views. The question is how to reconcile the use of language such
as this in The Manifesto, "its [the bourgeoisie's] downfall and the
victory of the proletariat are equally inevitable,"48 with that found
elsewhere, "Men make their own history. . . ."'I Perhaps Marx
was torn between his philosophical views and his practical desires,
for if man felt that his action was not needed, as inevitabily the
future would emerge, then he might remain passive; but if he
could influence the direction, or even hasten the pace, of the
change, then, perhaps, he could accomplish something by action.
Marx, in 1872, believed that there could be a constitutional and
peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism, but this would
require bourgeois acquiescence, i.e., man would actively co-
operate willingly and freely to undercut himself and his institu-
tions. In other words, the future, created by man, was a desi-
deratum which, in effect, might now be likened to a Machiavellian
version of the carrot technique, that is, holding forth the in-
evitability of a future classless and Utopian society, but requiring
the donkey to move himself toward it.
On the political-ideological front, and translated into current
47Hegel's philosophy of history viewed man as the instrument of an objective
idea (mind) whose legal approach used language which seemingly permitted man
to exercise a degree of control. See, e.g., my Reflections Upon Hege's Concept of
Property, Contract, Punishment, and Constitutional Law, 18 VAr-. L. RE v. 183,
186, 191 (1964), [hereinafter cited as Reflections] and T. M. KNox, HE E's
Prrmosopiny OF RIGaT 27-8, 30 (1942). Hegel insists upon man's "free will" in
many passages, but either simultaneously or later qualifies the common acceptation
and understanding of the term by rejecting its independence; his lanfuage rejects
the particular (individual) free will and goes, dialectrically, into the will [which]
is then universal ... " Knox, supra note 31. See also N. Haines, Politics and Pro-
test: Hegel and Social Criticism, 86 POL. Sci. QTLY. 406, 417 (1971).48 MARaST LintAY, Vol. III (1930), notes by D. Ryazanoff, supra note 42.
See also notes 170-73, a note on "The Class War and the Historical Process."
Marx, of course, was a child of 19th century Darwinism and the determinism of
the natural science approach and views of that period.
49 The quote continues "but they do not make it just as they please; they do
not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances
directly found, given and transmitted from the past." The Eighteenth Brumaire
of Louis Bonaparte, A HmnBooK OF MARMsm 116 (1935); see also Marx's third
thesis in his THmszs ON FET-ERBACH, at 229: "The materialist doctrine that men
are products of circumstances and upbringing and that therefore, changed men are
products of other circumstances, forgets that circumstances are chaned precisely
by men and that the educator must himself be educated. . . . This soft
determinism is illustrated by the continuing revolutionary activity of the U.S.S.R.
outside its borders and even if it desires co-existence, by the efforts of its leaders
to sway others diplomatically and militarily to communism.
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events, Russia and China (and all nations, including the United
States) affirmatively "plan" their countries' attitudes and relations
vis-a-vis the others (regardless of any planning in the economic,
social, and other spheres). 50 Peking enters the United Nations
because it, as well as that body, believes the other can be influ-
enced, if not led. Mao's China accuses Brezhnev's Russia of hav-
ing stratified the classes (and the class struggle) so that theo-
retical, as well as practical, accommodation with the West is
occurring. Russia has adopted the philosophical position that
communism can "live" with capitalism, whereas Mao, insists upon
the true deterministic position51 and therefore refuses to com-
promise.52 On the lower level of personal and governmental
relationships, so long as within Russia and China, as well as in
other nations whether they are totalitarian or democratic, indi-
viduals and groups refuse to accept, seek to change, or at least
continue to hope, then hard determinism anywhere cannot suc-
ceed.
On the international level there has been a continuing and
50 See, e.g., S. HooK, PoLrrcA PowEn A PERSONAL Fnmoam 127-44
(1959).
51 The key here is Marx's view that human nature must be transformed, that
is, the feudal society could not have been overthrown without there first having
occurred a change from a feudal mentality to a bourgeois one; the stresses then
resulted in the overthrow of the former. So, now, the bourgeois nature must be
changed to a socialist one, and it is the revolutionary intellectuals who actively
educate the proletariat so as to bring about a revolutionary consciousness and so
to change the world. Thus "The Great Leap Forward" exhorted the masses to
engage in numerous and local activities, even within their own back yards,
because in this fashion they would at least hasten (themselves change and so
determine) the changing future; is this not also the basic approach in the U.S.S.R.'s
various five-year plans the latest being the projected 1971-75 one which directs
practically evey detail of the economic life of the nation? The Cultural Revolu-
tion, which began in 1966, sought to purge the complacent and bureaucratic
who had begun aping the Russians (and yet a new Constitution, party council,
and re-vamped governmental structure is slowly re-building). See generally,
Sweezy, The Transition to Socialism, 28 MoNrHLY RBv. 1-16 (1971); see also
infra note 52.
52 Teproposition that Mao refuses to compromise is based on his statements
and theoretical propositions, together with his actions to date. See also Rumania's
President Nicolae Ceausescuys analogous crackdown on permissiveness in July,
1971, on his return from Peking, and his warning "of dangerous Western influences
creeping into Rumanian cultural life .. . N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1971, p. 10, col. 4.
So that if Mao is truly a soft determinist in seeking to lead and change human
nature, then his "concessions," such as the meeting with President Nixon, opening
the doors to Western visitors engaging in trade with the West, and seeking a seat
on the Security Council of the United Nations, are all tactics, a facade, and
really not sincere or meaningful for these tactics must either accept the others as
the are (the negation of international revolutionary communism) or else now
seek to infiltrate and change these others through these contracts (vide the conduct
of the Russians and Chinese throughout the world).
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increasing rejection of determinism that has culminated in this
century in what may be termed nationalistic anarchy, which has
resulted in the splitting up of older nations and their possessions
into many newly-formed nations. Throughout this area of inter-
national law the concepts of self-determination and cooperative
determination, with an outright rejection of compelled determina-
tion, have become accepted as the norms for the multi-nation
decision-making process found in the United Nations and regional
groupings. All of which means, at the very least, that hard
determinism does not enter this international picture in any
degree or shape. It is a variety of soft determinism which is used
in the practical affairs of nations, as with individuals, so that
"influences" are brought to bear as in the physical-military in
Vietnam, the economic-psychological in the Middle East, the
religious-political in the Pakistani-Indian conflict, the political-
economic-military in Europe. Separately, the concern of all
nations with international pollution and ecological imbalance
illustrates how planned international cooperation for deliberate
control and manipulation of natural and man-made causes to
achieve desired results necessarily partakes of the concept of
soft determinism, and so do other international efforts to control
aspects of war, commerce and trade, population, disease, food,
and all things entering and affecting the sought-after "good"
life.53
Legal determinism may thus also be thought of as simulta-
neously hard or soft, in different degrees and ways, in several
areas, but all for different reasons. The positivistic approach, as
exemplified by Kelsen, sets up a pure theory of empirical law
which is to be divorced from transcendental justice, any moral or
political aspects, the behavior of individuals which "is determined
by laws of nature according to the principle of causality,"54 any
form of natural law, etc.; it is anti-ideological and its orientation
is like that of analytical jurisprudence, although it tries to carry
53 E.g., the two-week meeting in Stockholm in June, 1972 of the United
Nations Conference on the Human Environment; see also this writer's Administra-
tive Conduct, supra note 43.
54 Here the behavior of individuals is determinstic, but is it bard or soft?
If present behavior is completely and finally determined by the past, then an
external legislative or judicial "control" seems to be unnecessary, perhaps even
objectionable. In utilizing such group effort and following the statutes out
positively (logically), is not Kelsen therefore disclosing himself as a soft
determinist? See also note 57, infra.
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on such method "more consistently than Austin and his fol-
lowers;"r5 it is a "monistic theory" which abolishes the duality of
law and State; and thus, in these and other respects, the pure
theory seeks to legitimatize positive law." This positive law is
unyielding and may be analogized to, although it is not, hard
determinism, 5 7 theoretically allowing no change in its logically
enunciated corollaries, and requiring application 8 in all its
features-although the validity of the basic norm, "which estab-
lishes the supreme, law-creating authority" and gives the positive
norms validity, is itself "unproved and must remain so within the
sphere of positive law itself."59 This concession, in effect, softens
the seemingly ingrained hardness by permitting the basic norm
a degree of flexibility (carried on into the downward sweep) even
though a cross-sectional slice, frozen at that moment, appears
hard and inflexible.60
55S. SHUMAN, LEGAL Posrrivism 12-13 (1963). Shuman examines the
differences between analytical jurisprudence and legal positivism on the basis of
his own interpretations and distinctions, thus feeling that "Austin would not be
considered a legal positivist even though he thought of himself as one. . . [Tihe
critical idea here is that legal positivism is not to be confused with the [philo-
sophical] term 'positivism.' . . .' Analytical jurisprudence is"a way... a method
of doing jurisprudence . . . [and] is not an explanation about what the law is.
On the contrary, legal positivism is precisely just such an explanation .. "
Logical, not legal, positivism, was initiated, as a philosophical approach, by the
Vienna Circle of the 1920's, e.g., A. AYE, LANGUAGE, TRUThr, AND Locic (1936);
I. CARNAP, THE LOGICAL SYNTAX Or LANGUAGE (1937).
56H. KELsEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAw AND STATE xvi xv, xvi (1945)
[hereinafter cited as KELsEN]. The term "pure theory of law" appears in the
Preface. For his additional treatments see, Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law and
Analytical Jurisprudence, 55 HAav. L. REv. 44 (1942), and Kelsen, The Pure
Theory of Law, 50 L.Q. REv. 474 (1934).
57 See text keyed to note 54, supra, where the behavior of individuals is
determined according to causality, that is, in the physical world causality is found.
Law, however, is not physical but, as it is ordinarily conceived and utilized
normative, i.e., man conditions it, and so law is an illustration of soft determinism
(at the least).
5 8 "Creation of law is always application of law .. " KELsEN, supra note 56,
at 133.
59 Id. at 395; see also 401 et seq., and 1-3. Prof. Patterson says this basic
norm is anchored "in the sky." E. PATrERsON, JUusPuDENcE 87 (1953).
60 Prof. Kelsen writes,
Again, a judicial decision may contradict the law. The contradiction
is eliminated if the law is found to mean that the judge ought to decide
according to the law, but that he can also make a valid judgment contrary
to the law, if this judgment has acquired the force of law, that is, when-
ever the legal order makes it impossible to nullify or change the judge's
decision (res ludicata). This principle that the judicial decision is valid
once it has legal force, even if it is not in accordance with the law, is
generally recognized and accepted in all positive legal orders. All positive
legal orders limit the possibility of voiding or changing a judicial
decision because it violates the law. Generally it appears more important
that a legal controversy be closed, once it is decided by a judgment, than(Continued on next page)
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Such a soft-hard aspect may also be found in the question,
whether inductively reasoned general laws can ever become
rigidly applied, i.e., in this latter application a form of hard
determinism whereas the formulation is necessarily one of soft?
Or, put differently, does any rational explanation, or the entry
of reason as a factor in drawing conclusions, entail indetermin-
ism?61 Reason and law are coin-faces, at least insofar as the
common law countries are concerned, for, in this writer's view,
eighteenth-century rationalism was preceded by the thirteenth
and fourteenth-century elaborations of rules made common for
all by reasoned determinations on particular fact situations.2
Whether it is an artificial or other species of reason is not material;
a degree of rationality, alternatives, and choices is implicit in the
concept and also the use of the term. Coincidentally, there is
the concomitant of thinking, will, and intellect-which may be
compressed into a form of choice, or of the freedom to reject as
well as to accept. Induction by its very definition and use makes
for tentativeness, as its generalities necessarily remain subject to
change as the factual basis is altered or broadened. Law in the
United States, whether statutory or judicial, is always tentative,
always utilizes reason, and always remains subject to change, i.e.
even in its application it is always soft.6 3
V
Throughout the law, as applied in practice and as taught, there
appears primarily and basically the concept of soft determinism.4
Hard determinism is an aberration as well as an exception. Law
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
that the judgment conform to the law under all circumstances. This
simply means that even a judicial decision which is contrary to law may
become valid itself. KELSEN, supra note 56, at 403.
61 See, e.g., P. WINcH, THE IDEA OF SocAL.. ScINcE 72, 93-94 (1958); see
also W. DRAY, LAws AND ExPLANATIONS IN HISTORY 138 (Oxford 1957); and H.
PETERS, THE CONCEPT OF MOTIVATION" (New York, 1958).62 See, e.g., this writer's views as expressed in NATuRE OF LEGAL EVIDENCE,
supra note 7; Forkosch, The Doctrine of Criminal Conspiracy and Its Modern Ap-
plication to Labor, 40 TEXAs L. REv. 303, 473 (1962); Forkosch, What is Legal
History? in ESSAYS IN LEGAL HISTORY OF FELix FRANKFURTER 2-22 (M. Forkosch
ed. 1966).
63 The classical illustration would be the Noble Experiment of the Prohibition
Era, and the Eighteenth and Twenty-First Amendment to the Federal Constitution.
See also, for an illustration of an excellent form of judicial legislation, Texas &
Pacific R.R. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907), as followed and
discussed in United States v. Western Pacific R.R., 352 U.S. 59 (1956).
64 See, e.g., my Reflections, supra note 47, at 192-4, discussing property and
contract, and at 194-7, discussing crime and punishment.
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cannot ordinarily and generally accept or utilize rigidities of this
or any type.65 Without indulging in semantics and definitions, a
trial involves a search for "the truth" with the nature of legal
evidence being stultified and limited by historic and current
values which (continually) change in time; 6 for a contract
ordinarily to eventuate there must be the freely exercised wills
of the respective parties; agencies and partnerships ordinarily
are created voluntarily by the participants; corporations do not
usually sprout, undesired and spontaneously, without human
beings who so choose to create; the very language of the marriage
ceremony incorporates the concept, as does the law which there-
after grants divorces; real property is transferred as a rule when
the grantor so wills it;6 7 a delict usually finds the wrongdoer
exercising his volition somewhere along the proximate and causal
line-if there could be volition so pleaded then the driver of an
automobile could well argue his complete innocence from willed
blame or fault, and no-fault accidents would result in no-restitu-
tion consequences, 6 and then would be an acceptance of predicted
highway deaths without attempting to reduce them or eliminate
causes; and even the continual revamping and experimentation
in law school curricula discloses a belief in change and the ability
to become better, to advance beyond through a willed change.
Crime and punishment are illustrations which may begin
either with man's violation of God's admonition in the Garden of
Eden, or man's evolution from the slime and the later ape.
Regardless, crime today involves the criminal's "implicit will, an
embodiment of his freedom, his right," as Hegel phrased it,69
65 There are, of course, exceptions to every general statement or rule, as
Cardozo's famous statement in Meinhard v. Salmon, 248 N.Y. 458, 464, 164 N.E.
545, 546 (1928):
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting
at arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee
is held to something stricter than morals of the market place. Not honesty
alone but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard
of behavior. As to this there has developed a tradition that is unbending
and inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of courts
of equity when petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty
by the 'disintegrating erosion' of particular exceptions....60 See, e.g., my NArtuE, supra note 7.
67 See, e.g., notes 47 and 64, supra.
68 Would a rule of law permitting this consequence violate the Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments? See, for some indication, M.
FoRKoscE, CONsTrruTioNAL LAW § 422 (2d ed. 1969).69 Reflections, supra note 47, at 195.
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so that each violator is held accountable for his chosen conduct.7"
This view remains even though the right-wrong M'Naghten test
was judicially somewhat and tentatively modified for the District
of Columbia by the Durham test in 1954, viz. that "an accused
is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product
of mental disease or mental defect." 1 The late Clarence Darrow
successfully expounded his own version of hard determinism, in
the famous Leopold-Loeb trial. 72 As to punishment, modem
penology assumes rehabilitation to be possible, i.e., that a prisoner
can himself voluntarily choose, control, condition, and correct
and so our society offers rewards (parole, etc.) to those who
choose correctly (as society desires [dictates] them to choose?) .73
The Katzenbach Commission's approach to the prevention of
crime is also an illustration of behavioral soft determinism, that is,
to eliminate "social conditions closely associated with crime ...
70 This is highlighted by Darrow's famous plea (infra note 72) urgin the
impact of conditions, background, etc., upon the minds and wills of colessed
murderers so as (successfully) to avoid the death penalty; today, of course, the
defense has become more sophisticated, as shown in note 71, infra.
71 Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874-5 (D.C. Cir. 1954), see also
notes 2 and 14, supra; Daniel M'Naghten's Case, 4 St.Tr.N.S. 847, 8 Eng. Rep. 718
(1843), which enunciated the analogy to the "wild beast" concept of criminal
responsibility; see also Smith v. United States, 36 F.2d 548 (D.C. Cir. 1929), i.e.,
the irresistible impulse test. The Durham rule was severely criticized, e.g., S.
RuBIN, PsYcinATRY Am THE CmNAL LAW (1968), and is not followed. See
further, BoAs, IEsPoNsrarr, supra note 21, at 511:
The criminal, moreover, is by his very nature a logical surd. His existence
can be observed but not deduced. That is the logical puzzle. Then too
he is called upon to behave in a manner in which his nature may prevent
him from behaving. That is the psychological puzzle. And finally he is
asked to accept as a standard of living norms which he jettisons at the
moment of committing his crime. And that is the ethical puzzle......
The history of the Durham rule is not discussed further save to call attention
to H.R. REP. No. 563, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), in which a majority of the
Committee on the District of Columbia recommended amending the law referring,
inter alia, to the "sysem of values which were [sic] grounded upon the basic
proposition that a person who possesses a free will is responsible for the misuse of
such free will."
72 In his closing argument to the judge he included this comment:
I do not know what it was that made these boys do this mad act, but I
do know.., that any one of an infinite number of causes reaching back to
the beginning might be working out . ..because someone in the past
has sinned against them.
F~ mous AmmucAu Jmry SPEEcHEs 992, 1015 (F. I-licks ed. 1925); see also note
70, supra.
73 See also text and notes 4-5, supra. Here behavior modification is essentially
involved, regardless of character change, i.e., man's nature. In general see R.
GOLDFARB & L. SINGER, AFTER CoNvIcTIoN: A NEW REvIEW OF THE AMERIcAN
CoMuEcroN SYSTEM (1972), who also feel that change in man is possible where
correction and proper techniques are scientifically utilized and applied, i.e., the
ability exists to alter the whole man (the making of "artificial" people?).
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and reducing the situations in which crimes are most likely to be
committed." 74
The law's approach to probability, chance, and illogic may
also be seen when condensed into the microcosm of society we
call the petit jury. Here, we say, is the conscience of the people
to be expressed, and the positivistic will of the state may be
frustrated, not only criminally but also civilly, that is, the jury
is not a mass phenomenon. Thus we have departed, if not com-
pletely, from the days when a judge could affirmatively order a
jury to decide in a decreed manner and hold them in durance
until so done,75 so that each jury (and juror) is different, cannot
be computerized, and may express its own independent views as
occasion warrants.7 6 In other words, the presentation of facts
numbered one through a thousand does not necessarily and never
can result in a known verdict, albeit time and again there will be
conformity.7 7
Behavioralism is not determinism as here discussed, but it
may illustrate how and to what a production economy may
necessarily be geared, so that such a nation's laws may partake
of this dominant tendency. Au contraire, where a consumer-
oriented philosophy is utilizing them, as with a bit of the current
approach, the backlash may express itself in the use of law and
legal actions to change the production atmosphere.7 8 Although
insurance in all fields may be oriented to mass statistics and the
laws of probability, so that even predictions of holiday deaths
on the highways are dishearteningly accurate, and although elec-
tions advertising budgets, and other forms of gauging and antici-
pating the mass public's behavior may be estimated accurately,
7, "The Challenge of Crime In a Free Society," A Report by the President's
Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice vi (1967), see also
pp. 3-6, 43-44, 58-66, 279 et seq. "The National Strategy" formulated by the
Commission opens its chapter with: "America can control crime," and then gives
its recommendations (see table at pp. 293-301).
76 Today a judge may direct a verdict or negatively set aside a verdict as
against the weight of the evidence or the law. See generally NATURE OF LEGAL
EviDENCE, supra note 7.7 6 In the law of criminal libel the jurors usually decide the law as well as the
facts, and in the ordinary criminal matter their power over the facts may express
the community's views as to the law's harshness or error, e.g., Forkosch, Freedom
of the Press: Croswe'lrs Case, 33 FoRD. L. Rav. 415 (1965), and the New Yorkjury's verdict in the 1971 trial of the Black Panthers.
77 See, e.g., BOAS, PEsPoNSBILrrY, supra note 21, at 507, on the Gambler's
Fallacy.78 See text and note 43, and also notes 12-13, supra.
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still, in the end, the individual and his differences, rather than his
likenesses, is what counts in the law. 9 At least for the common
law countries and those code nations in the Western stream of
culture, it is the individual for whom the law is promulgated and
for and to whom it is applied, not the contrary. The element of
indeterminateness, of probability rather than rigidity, figures in
every court proceeding, jury or nonjury, trial or appellate. The
quantitative extent to which this probability can be hazarded in
and throughout the law's application requires that hard de-
terminism be necessarily rejected.
The great internal upheavals of the 1960's in all countries,
whether student or worker led, whether by coups or consents,
generally were directed at institutions which had become jelled
and frozen. Rousseau's agonized plea on behalf of the common
man80 was reflected two hundred years later in all these continued
efforts, and the struggle for change never ceases. In all this the
law necessarily enters, at some point, if only to contain the use
of extreme force.8' And in all of this, including the law, there is
necessarily an illustration of the use and application of soft
determinism. 2 Without a rejection of hard determinism there
could never be the generalist, only the specialist, and it might be
argued, no culture, art, or civilization as the West and the East
have produced these past two thousand years, nor could a
pluralistic society be conceived or exist. Even the age-old yearn-
ing of man for absolutes has long been discarded and it is the
concept of the indeterminate amalgam which has been accepted
and is used.m
79 See, for a rejection of behaviorism, F. Wormuth, Matched-Dependent Be-
haviorism: The Cargo Cult in Political Science, 20 WEST POL. QTLY. 809 (1967),
and, for a volume of readings, L. Fi mA-N . & S. MAcAuLAY, LAw AND TnEmBE-
HAVIo, A. SCIENCES (1969).
80 Man is born free; and everywhere he is in chains. J. J. RoussFAsu,
THE SocIAL Co unRtcr 5 (1913).
81 The entry of the law does not necessarily mean that all force or violence is
"bad" or even ilegal, on which see, e.g., M. Forkosch, Is Violence an "American
Nightmare?", 4 GEORGrA L. REv. 439 (1970).82 See, e.g., J. REVEL, Wrrnotrr MARX oR JEsus (1971), postulating political
freedom as the first need, with economic freedom following, and advocating
numerous methods (e.g., sit-ins, boycotts) to effect changes in the status quo, i.e.,
institutions, and suggesting that it is in the United States that, as his sub-title puts
it, "The New American Revolution Has Begun."83This does not automatically and without more rule out faith, belief, and
(Continued on next page)
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There is thus an integral portion in the practitioner's and the
law school student's little green bags which must be comprised
of this deterministic concept and explicitly brought to their
attention. When and how this is to be done is not here discussed;
that it be done is indicated.
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
religion, especially for the pragmatist, on which see, e.g., notes 26-29, 39-40, supra
and also THE PoLrncAL PamosoPHY OF AR oLD BnacaT 148-60 (M. Forkosch
ed. 1954). Further, is not the acceptance of soft determinism itself an illustration
of some kind of belief or faith in man, i.e., humanism?
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